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INTRODUCTION 
 The State submits this supplemental brief pursuant to this Court’s 
October 27, 2014, order notifying the parties of the transfer of this matter to 
this Court from the Court of Appeals and setting the deadline for 
supplemental briefing.  See Appellate Docket.  The appeal challenges 
convictions for theft, two third-degree and two second-degree felonies; 
attempted theft, a third-degree felony; and theft by deception, a 
second-degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405 and -406 
(West 2004).  This supplemental brief is limited to Point I of the State’s brief 
and Points I and II of Defendant’s opening brief in the Court of Appeals 
involving the sufficiency of the evidence.  By email sent October 28, 2014, 
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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF 
BOTH HIS FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE THEFTS  
A. Defendant’s failure to marshal the evidence significantly 
affects, but is not a barrier to, appellate review of his 
sufficiency challenge. 
 At Point IB. of its responsive brief, the State argues that Defendant’s 
failure to properly marshal the evidence should prevent appellate review of 
his sufficiency arguments.   Aple.Br. 24-25.  The brief was filed twenty-eight 
days before issuance of State v. Nielsen, in which this Court reconciled its 
previous marshaling decisions and repudiated the default notion of 
marshaling in favor of the traditional principle which embraces marshaling 
“as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of persuasion.”  2014 UT 10, 
¶¶33-44, 326 P.3d 645.  Accordingly, the failure to marshal no longer 
forestalls appellate review, but it greatly undermines the credibility of claims 
of insufficient evidence.  Id. 
 Defendant’s failure to marshal the evidence in this case indicates the 
overall weakness of his sufficiency challenge.  He carries the burden of 
-3- 
identifying the relevant evidence put before the jury and demonstrating 
why, when viewed most favorably to the verdict, it did not support any of 
his convictions.  State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶13, 25 P.3d 985.  But instead of 
properly marshaling the evidence, or presenting a detailed discussion of it, 
Defendant recites some of the evidence in his fact statement, then simply 
reargues the evidence favorable to his position while ignoring unfavorable 
evidence.  His presentation completely overlooks much of the relevant 
evidence. 
 For example, neither Defendant’s facts nor his insufficiency 
arguments make any mention of the fact that when he met with the victims, 
they believed he had been appointed to represent them. See, e.g., Aplt.Br. 
5-40.1   The victims’ point of view is critical to the deception charge, which 
involves false impressions that are “likely to affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction.”  Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (West 2004).   It is equally 
relevant to the extortion charge because it would affect the victims’ view of 
Defendant’s threats concerning the quality of performance to be expected 
from appointed counsel. 
                                              
1 All the victims believed that Defendant had already been appointed 
as their counsel when they met with him. R460:22-25; R461:129-30, 217-19; 
R462:42-48, 70, 114-15.  
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Defendant’s sufficiency arguments also ignore the uncontested 
evidence that he misappropriated four of the victims’ applications for 
appointed counsel before the judge could review them.  R458:65-68, 89-90; 
R463:115-16; Aplt.Br. 24-41.  This unauthorized act demonstrated deception 
because it prevented the victims “from acquiring information likely to 
affect” their “judgment in the transaction.”  Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(5)(c).   
Accordingly, the State maintains its position that Defendant has failed 
to carry his marshaling burden.  Aple.Br. 24-25.  That failure does not 
prevent appellate review of his claim, but it greatly undermines the 
persuasiveness of his sufficiency arguments.  Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 42 (“[A] 
party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal 
if it fails to marshal.”).  
B. The parallel circumstances surrounding the multiple victims 
are integral to consideration of Defendant’s sufficiency claims. 
The parties’ appellate briefs have presented the circumstances 
surrounding Defendant’s charged conduct in a compartmentalized format, 
largely dictated by the number of charges and the numerous appellate 
issues.  However, a global view of the parallel circumstances involving all 
the victims provides a necessary perspective for review of Defendant’s 
sufficiency challenges. 
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The victims in this case were, in essence, a captive audience.  All were in 
court on pending criminal matters, all anticipated receiving appointed 
counsel, and all were sent to speak with the public defender.  Defendant was 
the only public defender contracted with the county.  R463:98.  All the 
victims were in need, and all were vulnerable to some degree.  They had 
been criminally charged, and most had been in jail.  Those in jail were 
anxious to be released the same day they spoke with Defendant.  R460:24; 
R461:86-87, 91; R462:97, 116, 119.  They were in varying states of financial 
stress and suffered from various stressors external to their criminal situation, 
including alcohol and medical problems, the financial and personal 
repercussions of being away from jobs or home, and an inability to provide 
for themselves or for their families.   R458:20-21, 71; R460:24, 45; R461:75-76, 
86-87, 91, 106-10, 203-05, 276-77; R462:44-48, 97, 116, 119; R463:103. 
Defendant had access to these victims by virtue of his contract as the sole 
public defender for Garfield County.  R458:7-8; R463:95, 98, 128.     In each 
case, Defendant met with the victims after they had applied for appointed 
counsel but before any decision was made.   R458:80; R460:20-25; 
R461:126-30, 217-19; R462:42-44, 58, 70, 114-15.  Notwithstanding that fact, 
each victim believed that Defendant had been appointed at their counsel 
when they spoke with Defendant.  R460:22-25; R461:129-30, 217-19; 
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R462:42-48, 70, 114-15.  Each met face-to-face with Defendant in a closed 
room of the courthouse, and Defendant broached the subject of retained 
counsel with the victims, asking about their assets or finances.  R458:20-21, 
34-35, 43-46, 71; R460:23, 29-30; R461:84-90, 95, 220-23; R462:10-12, 38, 42- 43, 
58, 62, 70, 114-15.  He did not disclose to the court or the prosecutor that 
there were undisclosed assets excluded from the victims’ applications for 
counsel.  Instead, he succeeded in convincing each individual to retain him 
on the spot and finalized the deals by preparing bills of sale and promissory 
notes or, with Burke, charging his father’s credit card.  R460:30, 38-39; 
R461:91-93, 114, 211, 221-22; R462:11-12, 43-44, 49-52, 117-18.   
Defendant’s conduct amounts to in-person solicitation, which is a 
concern in the legal profession.  Utah R. Prof. Conduct 7.3.  Under the best of 
circumstances, direct, in-person solicitation of prospective clients “is fraught 
with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.”  
Id., Comments 1 & 2.  The circumstances carry an inherent potential for 
abuse, subjecting the prospective clients to persuasion likely to overwhelm 
their judgment.  See id.   
That concern is especially relevant to the disturbingly similar 
circumstances facing the victims in this case. The victims were subjected to 
“the private importuning” of a “trained advocate in a direct interpersonal 
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encounter.”  Id., Comment 1.  They were not simply listening to an 
unsolicited sales pitch; facing significant stress from their criminal situations, 
they were unexpectedly faced with a lawyer insisting that they needed 
counsel and had to decide immediately whether or not to retain his services.  
The circumstances reasonably suggest that the victims would find it difficult 
to fully evaluate what action would suit their own best interests. 
 Further, they were being asked to purchase the very services they 
believed they were qualified to obtain for free.  Defendant did not ask the 
victims to decide between his services and those of another, less-qualified 
defense attorney.  Rather, he represented that the likely outcomes he could 
obtain for the victims would vary depending on whether he represented 
them as retained or appointed counsel.   Moreover, the services at issue were 
the same services covered by Defendant’s contract with the county.  With the 
exception of the potential federal matters that never arose with regard to 
Burke, each of the victims retained Defendant to defend against their state 
criminal charges.  
The jury had to evaluate the exchanges between Defendant and the 
victims in light of these common circumstances to determine whether 
Defendants’ acquisition of the victims’ property occurred by means of 
deception and extortion.  Aple.Br. 22-48.  Viewed most favorably to the 
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verdict, the circumstances amply demonstrate that Defendant targeted and 
took advantage of the victims and that his representations were deceptive.  
Defendant’s duty to the victims would be the same whether they 
became clients by appointment or by retainer.  “An appointed lawyer has the 
same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations 
of loyalty and confidentiality….”  Utah R. Prof.  Conduct 6.2, comment 3.  He 
owes the same duty of competence and diligence as well as the same duty of 
disclosure.  See id. Rule 1.1 (requiring competent representation); id. Rule 1.3 
(requiring diligent and prompt representation).  He also has a duty to both 
clients and prospective clients to avoid false or misleading communication 
about his services.  Id. Rule 7.1 & Comments 1 & 2.   
Accordingly, whether he was appointed or retained, Defendant had 
an ethical duty to represent his clients to the best of his ability.  The 
outcomes of the victims’ cases did not depend on whether he was appointed 
or retained as counsel.  It is uncontested that Defendant never told the 
victims as much.  Because both the prosecutor and the judge testified that 
they would handle cases the same whether defense counsel was appointed 
or retained (R463:99, 113, 159), the jury could reasonably decide that any 
difference in the outcomes that Defendant suggested would necessarily 
derive solely from his own action or inaction.  The jury could also reasonably 
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determine that Defendant’s representations regarding his services were, at a 
minimum, misleading and made solely for Defendant’s own profit.  This is 
especially true for those matters in which, after being retained, he disposed 
of the victims’ applications for counsel before they could be reviewed by the 
judge.  R458:65-68, 89-90; R463:115-16. 
The commonalities of Defendant’s interactions with all the victims 
provide an added perspective for review of Defendant’s sufficiency claims, 
reinforcing that there is ample evidence to support a theft conviction for each 
of the five victims on all charged alternatives.  See Aple.Br. 21-48. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant’s 
convictions. 
 Respectfully submitted on November 26, 2014. 
 SEAN D. REYES 
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 Assistant Attorney General 
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